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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~fAHAL~-\

E. LAWLOR,
Plaint·iff and Respondent

APPELLANTS

BRIEF

vs
R. KEITH LAWLOR,
Defendant and Appellant

Case No. 77 42

STATEMENT OFF ACT
~I ahala E. Lawlor filed suit against her husband,
R. ICeith Lawlor, for divorce. She alleged in her complaint, an10ng other things, that said defendant had
treated her cruelly, causing her great mental distress.
She failed to allege the value of a lot and house owned
by the parties, but alleged the value of certain bonds
(Canadian) at $1340.00, a 1938 Plymouth car at $500.00
and household furniture at $200.00 belonging to both
parties and other household goods belonging to her
exclusively with no allegation of value. She prayed for
divorce and $150.00 attorney fees as against defendant
and a reasonable property settlement. (pp. 1) The
defendant answered and put in a counterclaim denying
the cruelty but alleging if true there was condonation.
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He alleged cruelly on plaintiff's part causing him great

mental distress. He further alleged plaintiff had no·
interest in said Canadian bonds, that the car was worth
not more than $300.00, that he was 100% totally disabled
and was now unable to make a proper living for himself; that plaintiff was of full health and vigor and
making about $135.00 per month. He prayed plaintiff's
action be dismissed and that divorce be given him together with real property and that inasmuch as plaintiff had taken all Canadian bonds that she be made
to give him $250.00 so he could pay his attorney (pp. 5).
Plaintiff filed her reply alleging that 1/5 of said bonds
belonged to her, denied the cruelty alleged by defendant, admitted defendant's disability, employment of
plaintiff, possession of said bonds, alleged that defendant has contributed very little to support of family and
among other things enlarging on defendant's cruelty.
She further alleged house and lot was worth approximately $2500.00 (pp. 7).
The Court granted the plaintiff a divorce but prior
thereto Inade an interlocutory order (pp 10) to the effect that if defendant desired house and lot he deposit
wih the Clerk of the Court $5000.00 by July 9th, 1951
and if it be not so deposited as payment to the plaintiff
then the said property shall be awarded to plaintiff.
together with other property (pp. 16).
We further find the facts to be that plaintiff in all
these years of married life had by her own testimony
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llE'Yer brought up the subject of divorce, not even once
(tr. -16, ;)3 )that she further testified that defendant
had done all he could do under his physical handicaps
and that he

wa~

so handicapped when she married hiin

about 20 years ago ( tr. 40) through service in World

\r ar 1 and that she knew that defendant had been badly
shot-up and shell shocked (tr. 51). However, as stated
plaintiff admitted that defendant had done all he could
to 1nake a living and that when he was turned down
in his applications for jobs because of his physical handicaps he 1nade public issue of the matter in the newspaper (tr. 47, 48).
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL
OF JUDGMENT AND DECREE
Point No. 1. The Court erred in its finding No. 4
of its finding of fact that defendant and appellant
contributed very little to the support of the family since
the ,parties marriage and that plaintiff had supported
defendant and their son since their marriage.

Point No. 2. The Court erred in finding No. 5 of
its finding of fact that appellant was but partially
disabled and in not finding him totally disabled, and
erred also in finding that since 1942 appellant had
earned but $2000.00 in addition to his pension and that
same had been mostly used for his own expenses.
Point No. 3. The Court erred in its finding No. 6
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and every part thereof in· finding that the defendant
been intoxicated on various occasions and precipated
quarrels with respondent and that he had struck her both
in public and private causing her great 1nental distress
and causing her to lose her love for him.
Point No. 4. The Court erred in its finding No. 7
in finding that said facts as found in No. 6 of its findings, had caused her, the plaintiff, great mental and
physical distress and nervousness.
Point No; 5. The Court erred in that part of finding No. 8 which found Plymouth car worth the sum of
$500.00.
Point No. 6. The Court erred in its finding No. 10
and every part thereof in finding that the defendant
must deposit the sum of $5000.00 with the Clerk of the
Court if he should desire the house and lot and in the
evel'lt he did not the home should go to the plaintiff and
in failing to make the sum of $2500.00 or less if he
should want the home.
Point No. 7. The Court erred in its finding No.
11 that plaintiff had not been cruel toward the defendant in any respect.
Point No. 8. The Court erred in its finding No. 12
that all of the allegations of the cmnplaint are true
while those of the answer and counterclain1 are untrue.
Point No. 9. The Court erred in making its finding
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N"o. 13 of ih~ ~npple1nental finding that then• were

grounds for condonation of the plaintitf toward the
defendant but if there was, then the Court erred in finding that defendant had violated the tenns of condonation in drinking· and not providing himself with a job.
Point No. 10. The Court erred in its conclusion
of law no. 1, that plaintiff is entitled to a decree of diYorce against the defendant and appellant, and in not
concluding that defendant was entitled to a decree of
divorce against the plaintiff.
Point No. 11. The Court erred in its conclusion of
law No. 4 that unless the defendant deposited the sum
of 5000.00 with the Clerk of the Court by a certain time
the plaintiff was entitled to have the home awarded to
her and in not 1naking the smn of $2500.00 or less as a
condition of defendant acquiring home.
Point No. 12. The Court erred in awarding the
plaintiff a decree of divorce against the defendant and
appellant as set forth in paragraph 1 and 2 thereof and
In not awarding said decree to defendant.
Point No. 13. The Court erred in its decree of divorce in awarding the hmne and lot of the parties to the
plaintiff and respondent as set forth in paragraph No.
6 thereof, and in not awarding the defendant the same
upon the payment of $2500.00 by defendant and in further finding that defendant had made an election not to
take the home as he had done no affirmative act one way
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or the other to indicate that.

Point No. 14. The Court erred in its decree of divorce in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
that he must remove himself and personal effects by
a certain time from said home and in case he did not that
a writ of possession would be issued by the Court and
defendant ousted as set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 of
said decree.

ARGUMENT
Points No. 1 and 2
Point No. 1 and 2 cover the findings contained in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Court that defendant contributed but very little to the support of the family and
that defendant made but $2000.00 from the year 1942
until the divorce complaint was filed in addition to
the pension that he received for his injuries suffered
in the 1st World War and that he is only partially
disabled. (pp. 11, 12) The defendant testified that
he made approximately the sum of $16000.00 since coming to Logan (tr. 176) including pensions. The plaintiff
herself admitted that defendant had done all he could
under •his physical handicaps and conditions (tr. 48)
and that he even went so far in order to obtain work
to make a public issue of it in the newspaper (tr. 47)
and that he then got work. What more can be asked
of defendant~
That he is totally disabled is admitted in the plead-
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It will be noticed that in· pai·a-

graph -! of onr counterclaim we allege 100 per ·cent
total disability.

(p 6)

In par.agraph 6 of plaintiff's

reply (pp. 7) plaintiff admits that "defendant is disabled.'·

From this we have a right to assume an ad-

Inission of 100 per cent disability under sub-paragraph
b of Rule 8 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure which says
on page 11 ''that denials shall fairly meet the substance
of the averments denied". The fact that plaintiff
denies the remainder of paragraph four, we believe,
cannot be said to apply to said allegation of 100 per cent
disability, but to other averment in said paragraph 4
of our counter-claim.
That defendant placed money in bank made by him
In both of parties names (tr. 57) is not denied and
plaintiff drew on same by own admission. When asked
if she had placed money in said account she said occasionally, but she could produce no receipts ( tr. 37) and
it will be observed plaintiff was exceedingly evasive in
her answers on this subject ( tr. 37). Plaintiff admitted
that the last income tax that she paid she drew on the
joint bank account of the parties ( tr. 39). If defendant
had only made $2000.00 since 1942 as the Court found
it is most peculiar that defendant should have an account
at all for he would have an average income of only
$200.00 per year.· Plaintiff further testified she wrote
no checks out without appellant's consent and she did
so in paying the income tax of the parties last year.
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(tr, 39) 'rhis would certainly.seem to indicate that appelant was really making a substantial contribution to
the family. in spite of his many handicaps and that he
was the only one placing his income in the joint account, otherwise, why would respondent mention to him
about writing checks on said account.

In conclusion

on these points and as having reference to the division
of the property made by the Court in the decree, we
maintain it is inequitable for it gave to plaintiff in the
neighborhood of $6000.00 and appellant about $1350.00.
In this connection it will be noted that as defendant
said he had 1natched the plaintiff dollar for dollar
in what he 1nade during their married life about
$16,000.00 (tr. 176) and when I as defendant's counsel
sought to elicit the items that went to 1nake up this sum
the Court said, ''he testified he earned $16,000.00 Mr.
Sjostrom, why don't you let him cross-exa1nine ( tr. 177)
to which writer consented. But strange to say counsel
for plaintiff found it inadvisable to go into the various
sources of defendant's inc01ne. One thing more: Plaintiff was questioned by defendant's counsel if defendant
had ever asked her to go to work.
_..\. Well, in actions, yes.

Q. That's the way you want to answer the question?
A. When I'm hungry I would have sense enough
to go to work, so I guess I would answer yes in a case
of that kind (tr. 50).
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This is indeed a strange answer in view· of the fact
that the parties had Canadian ·bonds of the face value
of $1340.00 ( tr. 55) and which defendant had· received
in lieu of taking his pension check of $25.00 per n1onth.
That being undisputed it tnust be assun1ed that the
income of the parties was easily sufficient to take
care of living expenses and to which defendant testified
that he contributed as much as plaintiff.
.ARGUMENT

Points 3, 4, 7 and 8
Points 3 and 4 take up findings of 6 and 7 (pp. 12) ·
of the Court which in substance say that the defendant
had treated plaintiff cruelly causing her great distress.
Points 7 and 8 take up the findings of the Court in
paragraphs 11 and 12 (pp. 13) to the effect respectively
that plaintiff has not been cruel to defendant and that
all of the allegation of the complaint are true while
those of the answer and counter-claim of the defendant
are untrue. First as to the findings of the Court under
points 3 and 4 (finding 6 and 7) and then points 7 and
8 as it seems that it would be better, to a more clear
understanding of these findings ,by discussing them together in the order indicated.
It will be observed that plaintiff testified that in
1939 after a visit to "Mitch and Sallies", that defendant beat up on her so as to confine her to bed for 3 days
(tr. 14) but in regard to this matter defendant testified
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that they had been drinking and that 'he slapped her
after her giving him a shove ( tr. 98') and that she w~s
up the next morning.

It is peculiar indeed ·that he

could put her in bed for 3 days yet there is no testimony
that a doctor or police were called.

(In as much as

this is an equity case this Court has the right to make
such findings as to the truth of alleged· matters and
findings as to them the evidence warrants.) That she
should wait for 1~ years to bring up this matter is also
indeed peculiar. She further testified that he slapped
her for buying a pair of shoes 3 or 4 years after their
marriage (tr. 39) (16 years ago), but he denies this
and says that she had purchased gloves that were too
large for him ( tr. 98) and there was no slapping that
he merely chided her; that he never threw her against
the bathtub or sink as she testified (tr. 99) nor did he
ever threaten her with butcher knives (tr. 99); and that
all there was to the knife incident was that he and the
boys at a party in his fome had been sticking knives
in a hat and a cabinet and she became angry at the
incident as they were passing the "buck" as to who
actually did it, (tr. 99, 100) when she tried to find the
guilty party.
As to plaintiff's cruelty to defendant we believe
there is real substantial ground to believe it true. That
she went to Al Larsen's and told him not to let her
husband have any guns is not denied because of his
alleged instability, according to her (tr. 139, 170) yet

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
at the same thne she testified that she let the guns that

defendant -kept in their hon1e out for cleaning only
(tr· 170) and for no other purpose; that she left all
the butcher knives at their home ( tr. 171) and she knew
he could get guns and ammunition elsewhere (tr. 171,
172) So it is our opinion that she wanted his friends
to turn away from him so he would leave for Canada
where she wanted hin1 so n1uch to go. ( tr. 171) Defendant further testified that plaintiff had on numerous
occasions called his afflictions to his attention comparing him with the salesman that she was in the habit
of seeing (tr. 96); that he wanted the boy to go to college
but she wouldn't let him and also turned the boy against
him (tr. 96); that she would stay out at night until
3 in the morning then come in with liquor on her breath
(tr. 97); that she insisted on keeping all the obscene
exhibits in the house though he pleaded with her to get
rid of them, ( tr. 104, 108 exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6,) but
he received nothing in return but a tirade from her;
that she kissed and hugged other men (tr. 132) whicl:_
she did not deny. That plaintiff never put any money
in their joint bank account since coming to Logan as he
had (tr. 94) and she never told him what her salary was
(tr. 94).
We have the most conclusive exhibits in this cause
that shows the character of the plaintiff and for which
keeping she was subject to a court action-it being a
misdemeaner to have such exhibits. We are unable to
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bring ourselves to a point that anything that defendant
did could have affected her in any undesirable way taking her testirnony as being true· But we say with the
exception of the admitted slap he treated her in a most
proper way. And it rnay be said further, in connection
with her charge of cruelty, why did she not bring corroborating witness in such rnatters, they were readily
at hand and particularly her friend Johnson.
A person insisting on keeping the exhibits some of
which are, in her own handwriting, as here shown to have
been harbored and treasured by plaintiff even after requests by her husband to get rid of it depicts, to our
way of thinking, a person not steeped in the normal refinements of life but the opposite and to really injure
such a person a party would indeed have to go to the
extrerne. And no such injury or cruelty is shown by
plaintiff even if all she testified to is true which we do
not adrnit. If what we say here is true and we add to
this her intoxication in the small hours of the mornin:.;
and her calling defendant's and appellant's attention to
his physical handicaps which he certainly was in no
way to blame for and her kissing and hugging other
rnen, we urge that respondent has not made out a case
of legal cruelty against appellant. For as is said in
Am. J ur. Vol. 17 pp. 178, sec. 55 on divorce:
"While rnere incompatibility of temperament is
not itself grounds for divorce, it is well recognized, especially in the modern cases, that the
jury, or the court sitting as a trier of the facts,
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in deter1nining whether the circumstances show
cruelty, should always keep in view the intelligence. apparent refine1nent, and delicacy of sentiment of the cmuplaining party. These facts,
of course, Inay tend either to strengthen or \Veaken the case n1ade for there 1nay be cases in which
1nere blows should not be considered cruelty·.
These Inay be given, but still there may be strong
affection between the parties. Among persons
of coarse habits they might pass for very little
more than rudeness of language or manner. They
1night occasion no apprehension and be productive of only slight unhappiness. As strongly
expressed by one court: "It is not all unlawful
and barbarous acts that are made grounds of
divorec· We do not divorce savages and barbarians because they act as such towards each
other.''
In paragraphs 11 and 12 (points 8 and 9) the Court
finds that plaintiff has not been cruel to defendant in
any respect and all allegations of complaint are true
while those of the answer and counterclaim are untrue
as above mentioned.

We believe we have shown in the forgoing discussion
that plaintiff was cruel to defendant and that the allegation of the complaint were untrue and that the answer
and counterclaim are true. In this connection, as
going to plaintiff's credility 1n a y we further
point out that in plaintiff's reply she a II e g e s
the home to be worth $2500.00 ( pp. 9) and testified
to same an1ount ( tr. 52) yet the Court finds the home
to be worth $5000.00 (pp. 13) the amount which appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lant testified to as being its approximate value to him

for therapy purposes ( tr. 1333) Also, the Court finds
the Ply1nouth car, which was awarded to defendant worth
$500.00 (pp 13) when in open court defendant offered
her the car for $200.00 (tr. 53) and further offered to
give her $2500.00 for the home, (tr. 57, 8) which was refused.
It is only fair to assume from the evidence that
the plaintiff has found her "salesman" that she so
often spoke about and so often compared to the defendant who was getting along in years and that she
might as well drop him for another and evidently started
laying her plans months before trial, for it will he
noted defendant testified: ''She complained about being
the only bread winner of the home.
bringing home the groceries.

Claims all sundry

I've wanted to go down

and help her with the groceries for the last six months
and it seemed funny now that this thing comes up. She
doesn't want me around the store (meaning the store
in Logan where she worked) neither does she want me
to haul her around in the car with them.

She'll lug

the big packages across the square and complain that
they hurt her. I said "you don't have to do that (tr.
94)

There was no denial of this.

And we must re-

nlember that there are $1340.00 (face value) of Canadian
bonds that could be used.
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ARGUMENT
Points 5 and 6
\V e believe point No. 5 is taken care of and covered in our discussion points 7 and 8 (findings 11 and 12)
and will add but little to it- The Court found in its
finding No. 8 that the hon1e was worth the sum of
$5000.00 and the Plymouth car the su1n of $500.00. As
stated before we offered to let plaintiff have the car
for $200.00 in open Court but she refused it and further
offered her $2500.00 for the home the sum she testified and alleged it was worth. It is true that defendant said that the home was worth the sum of approxmiately $4800.00 to him because he needed it for his
therapy purposes (tr. 133) Yet the Court below found
both the allegations and testimony of the plaintiff as
to this property untrue and then in findings N o.10 (point
No. 6) said that defendant must pay the sum of $5000.00
to plaintiff if he was to take the home.
We can see no justice in that. It may be further
pointed out that the Court also made findings, findings
No. 11 and 12, to the effect that all the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint were true which of course
found that the home was worth but $2500·00. Why then
should the defendant be forced to give $5000.00 in order
to be-- awarded the place as found in finding No. 10
point No.6. In this finding of the Court below that the
home was worth $5000.00 it seems to us that the plaintiff
had knowingly testified falsely as well as misstating the
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value in her pleadings. It was evidently the plaintiff's
purpose to so Inislead the Court in this Inatter that the
Court could, without abuse of discretion, award the home
to her and award to the defendant what was actually awarded him in the decree to wit, the bonds, face value of
$1340.00, the car, value of $500.00 as found by the Court,
hut which we offered to plaintiff in open Court for
$200.00 and which she refused to take, and a few tools of
practically no value.

ARGUMENT
Point No. 9
\Ve believe the Court in its supplemental finding
No. 13 to the effect that there were grounds for condonation of the plaintiff toward the defendant but if
there ·were grounds for condonation (accepting the fact
that there had been legal cruelty by the defendant toward the plaintiff) then the Court erred in finding that
defendant violated the terms of condonation in drinkIng and not providing himself with a job.
As to alleged acts of cruelty we have already discussed that in points 3, 4, 7 and 8 and will not repeat.
We have searched the record and fail to find any testinlony on respondent's part that appellant had been
cruel to her within two years next prior to the bringing
of these procedings or that he had been drinking or
failed to do all in his power to contribute to the family.
Respondent, as has been heretofore pointed out, testified that appellant had done all he could under his phySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
sical handicaps (tr· 47. 48). And it n1ay be further noted
that at the very time that plaintiff filed suit for divorce
defendant was in :Montpelier working for the Deseret
News, a job she had told hiln to stay with and not go
to Hill Field or Second Street. (tr. 101, 96) This was
was not denied by the plaintiff as far as we have
been able to see by the record or remember from the
trial.

ARGUMENT
Points 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
In it's conclusion of law No. 1 (point No. 10) the
Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree
of diYorce against the defendant and failed to find that
the defendant was entitled to a decree against the
plaintiff, and in it's conclusion of law No. 4 (point No.
11) the Court found that unless the defendant had deposited the sum of $5000.00 with the Clerk of the Court
by July 9th, 1951, that he should not be entitled to the
home.
In the Courts decree of divorce contained in paragraph No. 1 (point 12) the Court below awarded the
decree of divorce to plaintiff as against the defendant and failed to award the decree in favor of the defendant and appellant. And in paragraph 6, 7, and 8
of said decree (points 13. and 14) the Court respectively
awarded the home to plaintiff and ordered the appellant to leave said home by July 9th, 1951 or the Court
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would issue a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff.
We urge that the Court erred in all these matters
and say, that in our opinion, the decree should have
been awarded to the defendant on the grounds of cruelty.
In support of this we direct the Court's attention to
our stateinent of the evidence and the transcription of
the same and further urge in argument the argument
put forth in support of our points 3, 4, 7, and 8, which
we believe shows no legal cruelty toward the plaintiff
by defendant but just the reverse and show that it was
plaintiff who was guilty of the acts of cruelty toward
the defendant.
In regards to the disposition of the property of
tl1e parties we feel, too, that it was inequitable for the
plaintiff in this case to receive 3 times as much property
as the defendant It will be noted that the property
was acctunulated from the joint efforts of the parties,
the defendant contributing no less than the plaintiff
even though he was disabled to such an extent as would
have discouraged many persons in like circumstances
from making any effort toward earning any income
at all. That his disabilities were known and fully appreciated by the plaintiff is admitted by the plaintiff
as heretofore shown and she had no right to assume
and she did not assume that the defendant would be able
to wholly support a family, that she would have to lend
a substantial supporting hand in making a living. And
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stated before and as proved by the record, as

has also been pointed out, plaintiff adn1itted that defendant had done all he could do under his n1any disabilities,
and that he, in order to obtain son1e work had to sign a
waiver that if he was injured that no claim would be
made for insurance. etc. (tr. 91)
May we now again draw this Court's attention to
a most peculiar finding or findings of the Court below
in finding that the car in question, and which was awarded to defendant, was worth $500.00 as alleged and testified to by the plaintiff even though the defendant in
open Court offered her the same for $200.00, and the
further finding of the Court that the home was worth
the sum of $5000.00, the amount the defendant testified
to as being it's worth, and not the sum of $2500.00, the
sum alleged in plaintiff's pleading and so testified to in
open Court by her. The Court further made the finding that if defendant would pay to plaintiff the su1n
of $5000.00 that he could have the home. In this connection it should be remembered that in open Court we
offered plaintiff the sum she both alleged and testified
to as to what the home was worth. May we not then
well ask: why should the Court take the value of the
automobile as set by the plaintiff and not by the defendant, and two, why should the Court take the value
of the home as set by the defendant, to-wit, the sum
of $5000.00 and not the value as set by the plaintiff
at $2500.00, a value she knew well, in our opinion to be
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false. And, too, if she swore falsely in this matter did
she not do so in other matters and particularly in regards to the alleged cruelty of the defendant toward her
and this all the more so when she had no corraborating
witness or witnesses~

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we urge that the Decree of Divorce
that the Court below awarded to the plaintiff be set
aside and a Decree be awarded to defendant and counterclaimant, and further, that this Court set aside the
award of the home to the plaintiff and allow the defendant the right to pay to plaintiff the sum of $2500·00
in lieu thereof or in the alternative, if this Court sees
fit, that plaintiff keep the home upon payment to defendant the sum of at least $1500.00. Of course this
$1500.00 is in addition to what Court below awarded
defendantRespectfully submitted,
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant.
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